Georgia started the war and Russia ended it

>They don't like when little country near them has better opportunity and
>better life quality, we understand. Shame.

loooool, is promoting this piece of propaganda the only reason you registered at imdb?

I think that you're stupid. this movie is based on lies. U.S. and Europe recognized that Georgia started the war

Sorry but there's no such thing as "independent report". Everyone has some agenda, and it's really hard these days to filter news.

Yossi

Really? Hey, why won't you actually read the report, instead of some stupid "summary"? I did. It's here: http://www.ceiig.ch/Report.html.

Here's a better summary (and I would actually write it even better, but anyway):

The report rules absolutely against Georgia on one count only: that its inital assault on South Ossetia was not in accordance with international law. It states: ’There is the question of whether the use of force by Georgia in South Ossetia, beginning with the shelling of Tskhinvali during the night of 7/8 August 2008, was justifiable under international law. It was not.’ The report goes on to state that the Georgian assault was not proportionate to the requirements of a defensive operation, while South Ossetia’s actions to repel this attack were in accordance with international law. After that, the report rules against Russia on almost every count. To sum up:

1) The report acknowledges the massive and sustained provocations to which Georgia had been subjected by Russia in the period preceding the conflict. Among these, ‘The mass conferral of Russian citizenship to Georgian nationals and the provision of passports on a massive scale on Georgian territory, including its breakaway provinces, without the consent of the Georgian Government runs against the principles of good neighbourliness and constitutes an open challenge to Georgian sovereignty and an interference in the internal affairs of Georgia’ (p. 18). Furthermore, ‘The decision by the Russian Federation to withdraw the 1996 CIS restrictions on Abkhazia (March 2008) and to authorise direct relations with the Abkhaz and South Ossetian sides in a number of fields (April 2008), added another dimension to an already complex situation in the area’ (p. 31).

2) The report acknowledges that the Georgian offensive did not come out of the blue, but in the context of escalating military preparations and activities by both sides over the preceding months, involving exchanges of fire and explosions on both sides of the front lines, so that the ‘ever-mounting tensions in the conflict zone were approaching the level of open military confrontation’ and ‘the stage seemed all set for a military conflict’ (pp. 18-19).

3) The report states that although ‘[t]he Mission is not in a position to consider as sufficiently substantiated the Georgian claim concerning a large-scale Russian military incursion into South Ossetia before 8 August 2008′, nevertheless it does not reject the claim; on the contrary, it lists several pieces of evidence that lend weight to Georgia’s accusations of a preparatory Russian military build-up prior to the war, including ‘the provision by the Russian side of training and military equipment to South Ossetian and Abkhaz forces prior to the August 2008 conflict’; ‘an influx of volunteers or mercenaries from the territory of the Russian Federation to South Ossetia through the Roki tunnel and over the Caucasus range in early August, as well as the presence of some Russian forces in South Ossetia, other than the Russian JPKF battalion, prior to 14.30 hours on 8 August 2008′; and the fact that ‘it seems that the Russian air force started its operations against Georgian targets, including those outside South Ossetian military boundaries, already in the morning of 8 August, i.e. prior to the time given in the Russian official information’ (p. 20).

4) The Report rejects Moscow’s claim that it was waging a defensive or legal war in Georgia. It notes that ‘much of the Russian action went far beyond the reasonable limits of defence’; that Russia’s actions ‘cannot be regarded as even remotely commensurate with the threat to Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia’; that Russia’s ‘continued destruction that came after the ceasefire agreement was not justifiable by any means’; and that ‘the Russian military action outside South Ossetia was essentially conducted in violation of international law’. It therefore concludes that ‘insofar as such extended Russian military action reaching out into Georgia was conducted in violation of international law, Georgian military forces were acting in legitimate self-defence under article 51 of the UN Charter.’ Consequently, ‘In a matter of a very few days, the pattern of legitimate and illegitimate miliary action had thus turned around between the two main actors Georgia and Russia’. The report notes in addition that the second front against Georgia opened by the Russians and Abkhazians in Abkhazia was ‘not justified under international law’ (pp. 23-25).

5) The Report rejects any possible justification of the Russian intervention in Georgia on humanitarian grounds, both because ‘Russia in particular has consistently and persistently objected to any justification of the NATO Kosovo intervention on humanitarian grounds’ and ‘can therefore not rely on this putative title to justify its own intervention on Georgian territory’, and because ‘as a directly neighbouring state, Russia has important political and other interests of its own in South Ossetia and the region. In such a constellation, a humanitarian intervention is not recognised at all’ (p. 24).

6) The report categorically rejects Russian claims that Georgia committed genocide against South Ossetian civilians: ‘After having carefully reviewed the facts in the light of the relevant law, the Mission concludes that to the best of its knowledge allegations of genocide committed by the Georgian side in the context of the August 2008 conflict and its aftermath are neither founded in law nor substantiated by factual evidence’ (pp. 26-27). It notes that the total number of South Ossetian civilian casualties in the whole of the August 2008 conflict was only 162, not the two thousand initially claimed by Moscow (p. 21).

7) Conversely, the Report attributed the worst and most systematic atrocities to the South Ossetian side: ‘With regard to allegations of ethnic cleansing committed by South Ossetian forces or irregular armed groups, however, the Mission found patterns of forced displacements of ethnic Georgians who had remained in their homes after the onset of hostilities. In addition, there was evidence of systematic looting and destruction of ethnic Georgian villages in South Ossetia. Consequently, several elements suggest the conclusion that ethnic cleansing was indeed practiced against ethnic Georgians in South Ossetia both during and after the August 2008 conflict’ (p. 27).

8 ) Finally, the Report condemns Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as contrary to international law: ‘South Ossetia did not have a right to secede from Georgia, and the same holds true for Abkhazia for much of the same reasons. Recognition of breakaway entities such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia by a third country is consequently contrary to international law in terms of an unlawful interference in the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the affected country, which is Georgia’ (p. 17).

Far from blaming the Georgian side for the conflict, the Report ends with a conclusion that most reasonable friends of Georgia could readily endorse: ‘This report shows that any explanation of the origins of the conflict cannot focus solely on the artillery attack on Tskhinvali in the night of 7/8 August and on what then developed into the questionable Georgian offensive in South Ossetia and the Russian military action. The evaluation also has to cover the run-up to the war during the years before and the mounting tensions in the months and weeks immediately preceding the outbreak of hostilities. It must also take into account years of provocations, mutual accusations, military and political threats and acts of violence both inside and outside the conflict zone. It has to consider, too, the impact of a great power’s coercive politics and diplomacy against a small and insubordinate neighbour, together with the small neighbour’s penchant for overplaying its hand and acting in the heat of the moment without careful consideration of the final outcome, not to mention its fear that it might permanently lose important parts of its territory through creeping annexation’ (p. 31).

To sum up: the Report rules against Russia on every ground except one. Although it acknowledges the illegality of the Georgian assault on Tskhinvali, it describes this assault not as gratuitous or unprovoked, but as having occurred in the context of a long period of sustained military and diplomatic provocations on the part of Russia, a great power, against its small neighbour, whose fears about permanent territorial loss were very real. The Report rejects Moscow’s claim that it acted for humanitarian reasons; that it acted to stop genocide; or that its action was in accordance with international law. On the contrary, it explicitly condemns Russia’s military actions as illegal under international law, and acknowledges the legality of Georgia’s attempts to defend itself from Russian invasion. The Report attributes by far the worst atrocities to the South Ossetian side, and endorses Georgian accusations of South Ossetian ethnic cleansing. It meanwhile rejects the massively exaggerated Russian claims of Georgian atrocities.

''Did the UN or anyone else recognize South Ossetia's independence before this war? In fact, how many countries recognize its indpendence today: 3, 4?''

And why is that? Perhaps because Georgia is the US's puppet, whereas South Ossetia has close ties with Russia.

''Who crossed who's border?''

The Georgian army crossed into the autonomous region of South Ossetia and committed crimes against the civilian population there.

''Georgia was no threat to Russia.''

Georgia was a threat to the South Ossetians, they killed Ossetian women and children, not only men, and Russia was right to act as a peacekeeper in that region. Infact, Russia has more of a right to be in war with Georgia (who were hostile to South Ossetia) that the US did with Iraq (who had been quiet for years, until the US opted for a war to de-throne Saddam).


If you are sick of the ''I love Jesus 100% signature'', copy and paste this into your profile!

Georgia crossed Russia's de jure borders. Fact is that those lands were no longer Georgia, Georgia wanted it back and started a war against Russia. Got owned.

SO is under Russia's protection. Not to mention Russia soldiers were killed by that shelling. You *beep* with Russia, Russia *beep* you back.

There is no single man to blame. The blame lies with both sides. But Saakashvili is an idiot, in diplomacy at least.

So? When Russia starts any bad behaviour, then you respond. You don't get to do a pre-emptive strike, not when you are the weaker power. That privilege only belongs to strong powers.

"Wow"? Oh, but I'm sure there's nothing "WOW" about actually believing a plane hit the Pentagon?

LOL. You got trolled by your own government and swallowed the bullsh*t sandwich. You accepted 1 video clip that conveniently doesn't show any plane, the only tape released out of 30+ cameras pointed at Pentagon. So the question any sane man has to ask is, are you even serious?...
________________
God is Dead. (c) Nietzsche

...Nietzsche is dead. (c) God

Fact 1. There were about 3000 peacekeepers stationed in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Also, there was a training exercise held by the russians in the Caucasus region. Add to that whatever units that had in Chechnya/Dagestan and you get your 20k+ troops in 1 day.

Fact 2. Russians were going into the georgian territory (and if you do have some military experience you'd know that:) for as long as there was a threat present there. You can't fire missiles from across your borders and not expect to be held accounted for it.

Fact 3. I believe that whatever pro-georgian citizens were in South Ossetia prior to conflict had fled into Georgia once the shooting started. Much like pro-russians went to North Ossetia. Georgians did have their own peacekeepers in South Ossetia too which were evacuating unexpectedly before the invasion.

2 wrongs absolutely make a right. That is the very basis of international relations, that 2 wrongs make a right. What the *beep* are you talking about?