Based on a true story, the BCCI Affair

A timeline with some excerpts to give a more concrete idea of the activities that the BCCI was involved in.


BCCI Timeline

Source: http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/timeline.jsp?timeline=complete_911_ timeline&financing_of_al-qaeda:_a_more_detailed_look=complete_911_ timeline_bcci

Excerpts:

1976: CIA and Other Intelligence Agencies Use BCCI to Control and Manipulate Criminals and Terrorists Worldwide

Investigative journalist Joseph Trento will later report that in 1976, the Safari Club, a newly formed secret cabal of intelligence agencies (see September 1, 1976-Early 1980s), decides it needs a network of banks to help finance its intelligence operations. Saudi Intelligence Minister Kamal Adham is given the task. “With the official blessing of George H. W. Bush as the head of the CIA, Adham transformed a small Pakistani merchant bank, the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), into a world-wide money-laundering machine, buying banks around the world to create the biggest clandestine money network in history.” BCCI was founded in 1972 by a Pakistani named Agha Hasan Abedi, who was an associate of Adham’s. Bush himself has an account at BCCI established while still director of the CIA. French customs will later raid the Paris BCCI branch and discover the account in Bush’s name. [Trento, 2005, pp. 104] Bush, Adham, and other intelligence heads work with Abedi to contrive “a plan that seemed too good to be true. The bank would solicit the business of every major terrorist, rebel, and underground organization in the world. The intelligence thus gained would be shared with ‘friends’ of BCCI.” CIA operative Raymond Close works closely with Adham on this. BCCI taps “into the CIA’s stockpile of misfits and malcontents to help man a 1,500-strong group of assassins and enforcers.”


September 1, 1976-Early 1980s: Secret Intelligence Cabal Works with Rogue CIA Elements to Influence Middle East and Africa
1978-1982: Criminal BCCI Secretly Buys CIA’s Main US Bank; Even as CIA Uses Bank for Covert Operations
1979-1991: US Government Ignores Over 700 Tips about BCCI’s Criminal Activities
1981-1991: CIA Uses BCCI Bank to Pay 500 British Informants


1981-1983: NSC Gains a Clear Picture of BCCI’s Criminal Activities from CIA Reports

Norman Bailey, a member of the National Security Council (NSC) whose specialty is monitoring terrorism by tracking finances, will later reveal that in the early 1980s the NSC learns that BCCI is not just a bank but is engaged in widespread criminal activity. “We were aware that BCCI was involved in drug-money transactions,” he will later say. “We were also aware that BCCI was involved with terrorists, technology transfers—including the unapproved transfer of US technology to the Soviet bloc—weapons dealing, the manipulation of financial markets, and other activities.” The main source for the NSC about this are reports from the CIA. From 1981 on, the NSC learns of BCCI’s role in illegal technology deals for Pakistan, Iraq, Libya, Iran, and other countries. A clear picture has emerged by the start of 1984. But neither the CIA nor the NSC take any action against the bank.


1982-1989: US Turns Blind Eye to BCCI and Pakistani Government Involvement in Heroin Trade

CIA covert weapons shipments are sent by the Pakistani army and the ISI to rebel camps in the North West Frontier province near the Afghanistan border. The governor of the province is Lieutenant General Fazle Haq, who author Alfred McCoy calls Pakistani President Muhammad Zia ul-Haq’s “closest confidant and the de facto overlord of the mujaheddin guerrillas.” Haq allows hundreds of heroin refineries to set up in his province. Beginning around 1982, Pakistani army trucks carrying CIA weapons from Karachi often pick up heroin in Haq’s province and return loaded with heroin. They are protected from police search by ISI papers. [McCoy, 2003, pp. 477]

By 1982, Haq is listed with Interpol as an international drug trafficker. But Haq also becomes known as a CIA asset. Despite his worsening reputation, visiting US politicians such as CIA Director William Casey and Vice President George H. W. Bush continue to meet with him when they visit Pakistan. Haq then moves his heroin money through the criminal Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI). A highly placed US official will later say that Haq “was our man… everybody knew that Haq was also running the drug trade” and that “BCCI was completely involved.” [Scott, 2007, pp. 73-75]


February 11, 1982: CIA Is Given Green Light to Take Part in Illegal Drug Trade in Afghanistan
1983: Pakistani Government Allows Drug Traffickers to Deposit Profits in BCCI Bank
1984: US Agencies Keep US Senator in Dark about BCCI’s Criminal Activities
1984-1986: CIA Reveals BCCI’s Drug and Terrorist Links to Other US Agencies, but No Action Taken
1984-1986: CIA Director Repeatedly Meets with Head of Criminal BCCI Bank, Funding of Afghan War Is Discussed


1984 and After: BCCI Dominates Supply Chain of CIA Supplies and Weapons Meant for Mujaheddin

By 1984, huge amounts of arms and ammunition for the mujaheddin fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan are pouring into Pakistan. These weapons are funded by the CIA and Saudi government, and generally come into the port of Karachi. The criminal BCCI bank has an enforcement arm nicknamed the “Black Network.” Time magazine reporters Jonathan Beaty and S.C. Gwynne will later describe it as “a Karachi-based cadre of bank operatives, paramilitary units, spies, and enforcers who handled BCCI’s darkest operations around the globe and trafficked in bribery and corruption.” By 1984, BCCI and its Black Network takes effective control of Karachi’s port, dominating Pakistan’s customs service there with bribery and intimidation. BCCI is thus in a position to dominate the flow of supplies to the mujaheddin.

Pakistan’s military handles the flow of weapons from Karachi to the Afghan border, but once there the supplies have to be carried by mules to reach the mujaheddin fighting in remote Afghan mountain ranges. BCCI controls this part of the supply chain as well. Sometimes BCCI personnel simply transport the supplies across Afghanistan to Iran and then sell them there for a profit. [Beaty and Gwynne, 1993, pp. 66, 315-316] The US government is aware of BCCI’s support role and cooperates with it. For instance, in 1987 USAID asks BCCI to buy 1,000 more mules to help the mujaheddin. [Los Angeles Times, 9/3/1991] At almost every step of the way, BCCI takes a cut of the profits and often steals some of the supplies. [Beaty and Gwynne, 1993, pp. 66, 315-316]


1984 and After: US and British Intelligence Are Aware that Terrorist Abu Nidal Is Using BCCI in London, but Take No Action

January 1985: Treasury Secretary Regan Reads ‘Dynamite’ CIA Report on BCCI Crimes, But Takes No Action

In January 1985, the CIA delivers a secret report about the criminal BCCI back to the Treasury Department. In an extraordinary departure from standard procedure, the report is hand-delivered by a CIA agent and printed on plain paper with no markings to indicate it came from the CIA. The report is given to Douglas Mulholland, a Treasury official serving as the CIA’s main link to that department. Mulholland then hand-delivers the report to Treasury Secretary Donald Regan, and calls its contents “dynamite.” It is not known what is in the report, but the Treasury Department sends back word that it wants to know more. However, as Time magazine reporters Jonathan Beaty and S. C. Gwynne will later relate: “Suddenly, and for no apparent reason, Treasury lost all interest in BCCI.… Someone had… gotten to Regan and Mulholland, and the message had been unambiguous: back off.” The Treasury Department takes no action against BCCI, even though the evidence of the bank’s involvement in money laundering by this time is overwhelming. [Beaty and Gwynne, 1993, pp. 325-328]


February 1988-December 1992: Justice Department Blocks Investigations into BCCI

Sen. John Kerry (D) stumbles across the criminality of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) while investigating international drug trafficking as part of a congressional oversight committee. He soon starts a vigorous congressional investigation of BCCI, and New York district attorney Robert Morgenthau launches a vigorous investigation as well. [New York Times, 7/29/1991] However, Kerry’s and Morgenthau’s investigations are consistently stifled. Kerry will later say that, “with the key exception of the Federal Reserve, there was almost no… information or cooperation provided by other government agencies.” [US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 12/1992] Kerry will later conclude that the Justice Department in particular went to great lengths to block his and Morgenthau’s investigations “through a variety of mechanisms, ranging from not making witnesses available, to not returning phone calls, to claiming that every aspect of the case was under investigation in a period when little, if anything was being done.” After the Bank of England shuts down BCCI in July 1991 (see July 5, 1991), making big headlines, Under Assistant Attorney General Robert Mueller takes over Justice Department efforts on BCCI and assigns many new attorneys to the case. But Kerry will ultimately conclude that the indictments the Justice Department brings forth against BCCI after that time were narrower and less detailed than those of Morgenthau’s, and often seemed to be in response to what Morgenthau was doing. [US Congress, 12/1992] Kerry submits his report on BCCI in December 1992, and after that investigations into BCCI peter out. President Bush will appoint Mueller to be director of the FBI shortly before 9/11


March 1991-December 1992: CIA Hides Its Relationship to Criminal BCCI

In March 1991, Sen. John Kerry’s Senate investigation of the criminal Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) investigation hears about a secret CIA report on BCCI that was given to the Customs Service. Kerry’s office asks the CIA for a copy, but is told the report does not exist. After months of wrangling, more and more information about the CIA’s ties to BCCI comes out, and the CIA eventually gives Kerry that report and many other reports relating to BCCI. But crucially, the CIA does not share documents on CIA operations using the bank. Kerry’s public report will conclude, “Key questions about the relationship between US intelligence and BCCI cannot be answered at this time, and may never be.” [Nation, 10/26/1992; US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 12/1992]

This story is hardly unique. The Rothschild family established themseves by financing wars. Dutch bankers made the Revolutionary Was possible.

This was what I was looking for.
I never had a problem believing all this. Everything was true. But I never thought it would be actual incidents I thought it was something like, Micheal Clayton or Syrriana.

Good info thanks for sharing.
now wonder this movie is not a hit, i never heard of it in my country. I doubt if it is being publicized like other movies

Thanks for this interesting information. It made the movie better for me.

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we were all leaving it for you, captain obvious. hope it was worth it!

What the $%*& is a Chinese Downhill?!?

yes, i remember reading about it. thanks for reminding me.
yes, there is a lot of truth in that movie. possibly too much. maybe that's why it didn't turn out to be a huge success ...
i believe though that the the way the BCCI and the movie's IBBC were run the same way every bank is run. with the exception of probably some banks in the muslim world which are not allowed to participate in usury.

read here how wachovia bank was linked to hundreds of millions of dollars in drug money:
http://justiceinmexico.org/2011/04/05/wachovia-bank-accused-of-laundering-billions-from-mexican-drug-cartels/

WACHOVIA BANK ACCUSED OF LAUNDERING BILLIONS FROM MEXICAN DRUG CARTELS
Posted by feliciagomez on April 5, 2011 · 3 Comments
04/02/11—After an investigation of a plane that landed in Ciudad del Carmen on April 10, 2006, it was revealed that the Sinaloa drug cartel purchased the plane with money laundered through Wachovia, now a part of Wells Fargo. The investigation was led by agents from the US Drug and Law Enforcement Administration, and the Internal Revenue Service, among others. Mexican police forces also found 5.7 tons of cocaine valued at $100 million dollars. “Authorities uncovered billions of dollars in wire transfers, traveler’s checks, and cash shipments through Mexican exchanges into Wachovia accounts,” stated a recent Guardian article. It was also discovered that 13 billion dollars were ultimately channeled through correspondent bank accounts at Wachovia to purchase airplanes for the use of drug trafficking in Mexico.
Following these discoveries, Wachovia was put under immediate investigation for failing to maintain an anti-money laundering program. This investigation led to criminal proceedings against Wachovia, which were settled out of court under the U.S. Bank Secrecy Act in March 2010. Wachovia ultimately paid federal authorities $110 million in forfeiture, a $50 million fine for failing to monitor cash flow, and a sanction because it never applied the proper anti-money laundering structures to a transfer of $378.4 billion dollars. .
Jeffrey Sloman, the federal prosecutor on the case, pointed out that Wachovia’s “blatant disregard” for banking laws only incurred a fine less than 2% of the bank’s 12.3 billion dollar profit in 2009. Antonio Maria Costa, head of the U.N. office on drugs and crime in 2008, stated that there was evidence to suggest that proceeds from drugs and crime were seen as “liquid investment capital” that were only available to those banks who were in trouble of collapsing. He also said that interbank loans were funded by money from the drug trade, which saved a number of banks during the 2008 banking crisis.
Wachovia is also accused of proceeding with their business despite knowing the illicit nature of its activity. Jose Luis Marmolejo, a prosecutor for the case, said that the bank handled all of the transfers, but never filed any as suspicious. It has also surfaced that Wachovia ignored numerous complaints brought by whistleblower Martin Woods, a senior anti-money laundering officer who joined the bank in 2005. He discussed the concerns arising from Wachovia’s suspicious ties to Mexico with the bank’s head of global anti-money laundering for correspondent banking and then filed a series of suspicious activity reports, or SARS. The response from the Wachovia Bank in Miami, which served as the center for Latin American business, was not supportive, according to Woods. Increasing pressure and attention from the U.S. attorney’s office in 2007, however, led Wachovia to eventually cut ties with some of its “casas de cambio,” or currency exchange locations, with whom it did business in Mexico. Woods eventually found a representative from the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) to take up and investigate the case, which resulted in the 2010 settlement.
Since the involvement of Wachovia and other U.S. banks with connections to Mexican drug cartels, Mexico has announced a plan to reward people who report suspected money laundering, which would allow the awardees to get up to one-quarter of the illicit funds or property seized. Under this new plan, people will be able to file reports in person, by telephone, or by email and the amount of their reward will be determined by a special committee. All people are eligible except public servants, law enforcement, and banking employees who would only be duplicating their efforts to monitor suspicious activity.

also: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/03/us-bank-mexico-drug-gangs

point being: criminal banks are not the exception, but the rule.

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