How about preventing the country from becoming communist due to a communist insurgency? In 1965, the idea that a sovereign country would invade South Vietnam was preposterous. While it was an open secret that North Vietnam funneled supplies and encouraged volunteers to succor the Viet Minh, it was not reasonable for North Vietnam to expect to be able to conduct a conventional invasion with regular forces and not elicit a UN response, akin to what North Korea did in 1950.
And in that respect, they succeeded. They stabilized the wavering Saigon government, strengthened South Vietnamese armed forces, and utterly defeated the Viet Cong by the time maneuver forces left in 1973.
But was there any strategic value in defending South Vietnam from without indefinitely? After the strategic value was gone, it makes sense that the US would withdraw. And after they withdrew, if another sovereign nation attempted to invade, the US would have to make a decision as to whether it was strategically worth it to re-engage. In 1975, it was not worth it.
But in 1965, their engagement was worth it -- as a demonstration to other regional nations dealing with communist threats, that the US was willing to provide the same level of outside support that those communists were receiving from China and USSR. Over the course of eight years of fighting in Vietnam, the US shored up anti-communist strength in areas of far more strategic value -- most notably, Indonesia.
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