Spruance was entirely right in his decision not to continue the battle. There was no way he could have known for sure that, all the carriers the enemy had were sunk, and there were not two heavy and some lights out their to cotend with. He had done is job, whipped the enemy. He had lost alot of his air power, the Yorktown was damamged. The Japanese could never have held Midway even if they took it.
shareIt depends how soon the Japanese could have brought in reserve air power. From what I have read the Japanese senior officers feared the Americans would be able to reinforce Midway with aircraft in less than 48 hours which would have been insufficient time for the IJN to implement a plan. If Yamamoto could have brought in light carriers within 24 hours he might have been tempted to take another crack at Midway. In my opinion I think the Japanese were a little shocked that their intelligence could not get a handle on the American carrier situation prior to the battle and maybe felt a little too cursed to have tried to carry on. We also need to consider the value of the other light carriers in other operations for the IJN.
shareIn retrospect. Yamamoto could have almost certainly forced the issue with his battleships and many cruisers and destroyers. Neither Spruance nor Midway had significant operational torpedo bombers remaining on 4-6 June (just 3 operational TBDs, armed with slow torpedoes with relatively weak warheads) and the dive bombers had no armor-piercing bombs.
But Yamamoto did not have these details that we do, and besides, Midway was probably too tough for the modest landing force, even if Spruance was chased far away.
Entropy ain't what it used to be.
If the Japanese had pressed on they could have took midway, but what was the point. It would have been beyond their land based bombers, relying entirely on the fleet for supply. Subject to recapture and loss all the time they held it.
shareMostly agreed. But Midway was a very tough nut after being reinforced before the battle, and the reef encircling it was a major drawback for an invader. There was only one channel through the reef. The Japanese landing force did not greatly outnumber the defenders, and would need to approach through that narrow channel. The Japanese did not have the advanced amphibious doctrines that the USN developed in 1943-45, and had considerable difficulty with opposed landings. Their pre-invasion bombardment technique was not advanced, and was known to fail completely. Their pre-invasion bombardment at Wake Island, performed by a very similar force (4 heavy cruisers) to the Midway bombardment force, failed to hit any part of Wake
Island with even one shell.
But we cannot rule out the possibility of a Japanese success. In that case, they would have a temporary victory, as you point out, and given Japan's long-term logistical and industrial limitations, eventual defeat around Midway or starvation of the garrison was almost certain.
Entropy ain't what it used to be.
Perhaps the most important point to Yamamoto was that to the best of his knowledge two carriers survived whether he knew they were at Midway or not. Before Coral Sea IJN knew the Americans had 5 large carriers for the Pacific theater with the Saratoga not available but yet out of harm's way on the West Coast. Going back to Yamamoto's plan of a debilitating strike it was not possible to further harm American carrier strength beyond the loss of the Yorktown so he was not willing to further risk his own forces. As noted before here Japan could not hope to out do America in building replacements for lost vessels so as ships were lost the remaining vessels increased in value exponentially.
shareit was not possible to further harm American carrier strength...
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Mikuma and Suzuya were lost that way, but not Kumano.
shareCorrect. And Mogami.
Mikuma had onboard torpedoes explode after being bombed off Midway, and then sank. Mogami, also bombed that day, had jettisoned her torpedoes and avoided such secondary explosions.
Suzuya was near-missed by a 500 pound bomb during the Battle off Samar, and fragments ignited her stowed torpedoes, followed by explosions of stowed torpedoes, and loss of the ship.
Mogami was hit by just about every sort of ordnance the same day, and proved amazingly resilient, but suffered a secondary explosion among her stowed torpedoes. She sank.
Some of these might have sunk anyway.
These were not the only examples of Japanese cruisers sunk or beached after explosions among stowed torpedoes.
The added vulnerability of cruisers carrying oxygen torpedoes should be apparent.
Entropy ain't what it used to be.
I agree Spruance made the right decision at the time
Could Japan have taken Midway without those 4 carriers, doubtful, but maybe
They're amphibious,notions weren't as bad as some
The British used modified lifeboats in their Dieppe landings
I don't recall any US landing prior to Guadalcanal, Torch was late 42
We had by that time developed specific craft for the purpose
So for arguments sake, lets say Japan invaded, and was sucessfull, and gotton a resupply in
Why does anyone presume we would have gone to re-take it??
We didn't retake Wake until real close to the end of the war, if not after.
It wasn't deemed militarily important
Midway about the same, the same location on the map, a little bigger base.
Just wondering
You don't have to stand tall, but you do have to stand up!
If the Japanese had pushed the invasion anyway, Spruance would have been able to attack their invasion force. Transports are easier to sink than warships.
shareIf the Japanese had suprised us at Midway, I am not sure it would have worked out for them. The forces they would have had to invest to keep it would have been large and eventually it would have been overcome.
shareThey'd have been over-extended. By mid or late 1943, it would have been a liability for Japan.
Entropy ain't what it used to be.
it would have probably meant they then had to invade Hawaii..
the whole strategy to get that far East across the Pacific was probably wrong, they should have hunkered down in West, and maybe actually waited for this 'decisive battle" that they believed in almost like a prophesy, to actually happen.
And it may have..
there was no hope of an invasion in the wake of the naval battle outcome they got..
even the indecisive battle in Coral Sea a few weeks earlier with far lower Japanese losses, was enough to put them off landing from the sea in Port Moresby..
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