While intentionally, directly spending the Soviets into bankruptcy was perhaps not on the public U.S. radar until much later, the government definitely knew the Soviets were over-extended (financially, militarily, politically, geographically...) and could not continue indefinitely, at least as early as 1972.
One of my professors at UCLA also worked for the Rand Corporation (an early think tank that advised the government and politicians on technical and political issues of domestic and international importance), and served as an adviser to Senator Henry ("Scoop") Jackson on foreign policy--he was. He taught classes at UCLA on Soviet Government---those classes that kept you riveted to your seat and speechless, wanting more and more. He was brilliant and an expert on everything from the early KGB during WWII (esp in Poland, where the KGB was quartered in his family's home while he was growing up) to then-current Russian popular opinion.
One of the professor's favorite subjects was to talk extemporaneously on the Soviet inability to last long-term because they were sucking such huge amounts of money out of the economy for military ventures and military hardware so that the people were becoming sick of it. He used to say that all the people wanted were Beatle records, worn U.S. Levi jeans and it would be the downfall of the Soviet Union. This was in 1972 and 73. "Just wait," he'd say.
My professor once had to take visiting Soviets out to see some of Southern California. He loved to tell us how he took them to Pacific Palisades and through the neighborhood of huge homes that overlooked Santa Monica Bay and the Pacific Ocean, telling visitors this was how American workers lived...swimming pools, big homes, servants.... He never showed them real working class neighborhoods in Reseda, Burbank, or even Torrance. And there was no internet then to check for the truth about Southern Calif. demographics...
Anyway, he and colleagues advising the Foreign Relations Committees and others in the government knew very well that the USSR was extended too far trying to remain so militarized (and needing to design and develop all the aircraft, spacecraft, ships, weapons systems, and supporting technology such as communications, avionics, and power systems, etc) and first in space, and simultaneously to rule so many countries with an iron fist. Russia was supporting North Korea but unlike U.S. support for South Korea, the North was not growing its own economy, developing markets for Soviet countries to sell goods to North Koreans, recoup aid....it was pure charity, buying only loyalty.
The Soviet Union modernized and industrialized very rapidly from an agrarian economy at the turn of the 20th century, but it did so at the people's expense. The cost was great, esp added to the suffering of Soviet people in WWI and WWII and after, rebuilding. So repression became necessary to keep order, prevent people from demanding the personal goods and the social freedoms other possessed around the world. All of this was no secret from the West. Experts on Russian affairs, on Soviet foreign policy, and on Soviet govt and economics wrote and spoke on these subjects. And they advised our State Department, Congress and administration on the potential consequences.
However, as a matter of degree, it was not considered to be nearly as imminent as it became later when the burden of the war in Afghanistan that sucked not just money from the Soviet economy but the lives of Soviet people. Afghanistan sped-up the inevitable. But it had been coming since the Revolution, and had picked-up speed in each pogrom, every genocidal cleansing of agricultural workers, peasants, in every war, invasion, and clamp-down on emerging democratic movements in countries behind the iron curtain...every time the tanks rolled into Czechoslovakia or Hungary, or Poland, or military assistance was sent to North Korea, or Cuba... the fall of the USSR became closer, more iminent...
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