Yamato turns back

I watched the movie this afternoon, I wonder if the battle is very loosely based on Leyte Gulf, The Battle off Samar on October 25th 1944 when the Yamato in attendance with a large support fleet was on the verge off overwhelming Taffy 3, part of The US 7th Fleet. If the Yamato had carried on she would have been able to reach the invasion beaches of Leyte where nearly 200,000 US troops were waiting to disembark the slaughter would have been beyong imagination.

Having brushed aside the gallant destroyer escorts and escort carriers there were no US capital ships capable of stopping the Japanese fleet yet they turned around and fled. For a great read on this action try reading "The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors" by James D. Hornfischer.

In the Battle of Samar, Admiral Kurita, in command of the Japanese surface group, did order a retreat just when he was about to achieve victory. He did survive the war and retired to become a gardener. Pestered by reporters for years to comment on this decision to retreat, he refused to say anything for years. In 1952, he finally gave several conflicting answers in a magazine interview.

His first reason stated was that it started out to be a re-grouping of his far-flung units back into battle formation before pressing on to Leyte. His intention was to return for a night assault. He never did.

His second reason was given as regret for the loss of so many young sailors up till that minute and he fell back to preserve their lives and the ships of his command.

In my opinion, both explanations ring hollow. Why? Because Kurita's surface force was expendable, just as the Decoy Force of empty aircraft carriers which lured away Halsey or the Southern Force of Japanese battleships approaching the Surigao Strait and its doom. I think Kurita lost his nerve or at least, lost track of why he was there at all. This was their last chance and he squandered it.

Kurita was very clever to retreat westward after Musashi was sunk by air raids and then reverse course overnight to appear off Samar at dawn with little US opposition. But his decision to withdraw after engaging Taffy-3 was weak-minded, especially since his flagship Yamato was undamaged (unlike the big fuel-like explosion on the fore deck in the movie.)

Don't get me wrong...I'm very glad he retreated and I'm proud of the "Tin Can Sailors." They were the ones who sortied against a mighty force in their little ships.

CmdrCody

Well, what it really comes down to is what one or two of the posters above stated explicitly -- there were several times when the commanders of various Japanese naval forces literaly snatched defeat from the jaws of victory with timidity inspired by one thing or another, so that real-life events like the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal (Night Action phase) or the Battle off Samar portion of the Battle of Leyte Gulf serve as ample precedent for the Japanese withdrawal shown in the movie. To people well-versed in Pacific War naval history the outcome is not hard to believe, though to those without such background it is understandable why the outcome might seem perplexing.

A ship's fuel bunkers (tanks) are located low and on the sides of the ship. This has the benefit of providing ballast, to help hold the keel down, and for use in damage control when the hull is ruptured below the waterline. By pumping fuel from the damaged side to the opposite side a list can be induced that brings the hole out of the water, if it's not too far below waterline.

However, as I recollect, fuel shortages were causing severe problems for Japan by this time. U.S. submarines had put so many maru's on the bottom that Japan could no longer import enough oil from southeast Asia.

In the book upon which this movie is based, Admiral Torrey sent a single destroyer out away from the rest of the fleet. The purpose of this was to open up, in the clear, and simulate a Fast Carrier Task Force. The one thing all the IJN Admiralty feared was an attack from a FCTF putting over 300 planes in the air. Remember, this was post Midway, in which just 2 and a half Large Carriers destroyed Carrier Division 1 and 2, sending four IJN carriers to the bottom.

Egan Powell quips "...Fast Carrier Task Force! Hell, have them pretend to be the whole damned Pacific Fleet!"

ckamerer: That is the historic consensus about Japanese Admiral Kurita, in command of the Yamato battleforce. His task group was part of the "Sho" plan of the Japanese High Command to deal with the American invasion of Leyte.

The central aspect of that Japanese plan, and an aspect which Kurita forgot amidst his struggle with the Taffy-3 destroyer group was...THAT ALL JAPANESE SHIPS IN THE OPERATION WERE EXPENDABLE. They were to close on the US enemy at ALL costs and sink as many of their vessels as possible, OR BE DESTROYED TRYING.

Kurita survived the war and became a gardener in retirement. In 1955, he gave a newspaper interviewer several vague answers why he turned back, just at his moment of triumph off Samar. What becomes clear from his comments was that the great naval tactician of the Imperial Navy got befuddled and lost his nerve when the American Tin Can sailors rushed toward his mighty flagship in their puny destroyers with their 5 inch guns blazing and their torpedoes swishing.

Kurita lost sight of why he and his forces were in "harm's way." Thank God he did.

CmdrCody

Very enjoyable thread. Great points about the one strange flaw in the Imperial Japanese Navy's otherwise formidable performance in WWII surface warfare operations...the odd tendency Japanese admirals had of failing to exploit their victories.

Even in the Battle of Savo Island, one of the most brilliant surface warfare victories ever achieved by any navy in the modern age, the Japanese actually turned away before they COMPLETED that victory...by failing to engage and sink the American transports that were their actual primary targets in the first place. Just like at Samar.

Honestly, although the historical precedents for the YAMATO retreating at the end of IN HARM'S WAY are well established, I have to admit that the puzzlement felt by some viewers is STILL legitimate. I think the reason Fonda's Nimitz character doesn't answer John Wayne's question is that at the time no one in the American Navy could really figure out the why of it themselves.

Yes, it was the fear of mass attacks by carrier-based US aircraft, AFTER the surface battle, that fueled the Japanese urge to turn away from the battle as soon as possible. Remember, the Japanese would have a long way to go to get their fleet back to safety, making them easy targets for air attack all the way back. The Japanese greatly (and rightly) feared the prowess of American naval air power. The Japanese actually lost a battleship in exactly that way during the naval battles in the Solomon Islands during 1942.

It should be pointed out that the Japanese had carriers and air support of their own during the naval battles of 1942. The fact that they had no air support in the battle in the film harkens more to the Battle of Leyte Gulf in 1944, when foolish Japanese squandering of their experienced pilots (and the Marianas Turkey Shoot earlier that year) gutted Japanese carrier-based air power. But the lack of US carrier based air in the film goes back more to the Solomon Island battles of 1942. At one point during those battles the US had NO carriers left in the area, although they did have aircraft out of Henderson Field on Guadalcanal.