Spin!


I read an interesting article on BBC website this week by Saul David.

According to reports of the time, Chard was "a useless Officer" and Bromhead was "popular and good at anything, (but soldiering!")

The importance of Rorke's Drift was highlighted for the benefit of the public at home who had been dumbstruck (quote) by the defeat earlier at Isandhlwana. Shamefully, Chelmsford covered up his mistakes with blatant lies, saying Col. Durnford had disobeyed orders, when Durnford had not been given any! Chelmsford was told that Isandhlwana was being over-run but he ignored the warning - an Artillery Officer and his unit and an Infantry company DID turn back, on the Officer's own initiative, but was ordered back to the main column by Lord C., saying the warning was "a false alarm"! Out of 1750 British and Native troops, only 400 survived the Zulu assault.

It was Commissary Dalton who alone managed to persuade Chard & Bromhead to stand and fight at RD as these two Officers had wanted to immediately abandon the small outpost,and flee. It was also Dalton who largely helped to organise the planning for defence.
For his initiative and bravery, he was left off the first list of VC's issued, and only awarded one about a year later after huge pressure in the Press. He died 7 years afterwards.

The British Government did NOT want a war with the Zulus - Sir Bartle Frere forced their hand and took unilateral action. His reason was he had desired a South African Confederation and a standing army of 40k Zulus would have been a threat to that political strategy.

Chelmsford only kept his post (he was promoted later!)as he had the ear of Queen Victoria who liked him. The Government was defeated in a General Election the following year.


reply

I would also recommend his book which covers all the Battles.

Zulu: The Heroism and Tragedy of the Zulu War: Saul David







"A wise man proportions his belief to the evidence"
David Hume

reply

Thanks, will mark this down on my winter reading list.
I had heard of Mr David but confess to never having read any of his books.

As the author admitted in his short article for the BBC, all generals have made mistakes but never had a general (Chelmsford) gone to such lengths to cover up his own.
He should have been hauled up before a tribunal and court-martialled for his negligence and ineptitude. To blame another officer for his own errors was unforgiveable and cowardly to boot. Seemingly, he died suddenly in his Club in London, playing billiards!

reply

David's biography of Lord Cardigan (of Light Brigade infamy) is quite entertaining. I haven't read his Zulu book yet.

My main knowledge of the Zulu Wars comes from The Washing of the Spears, which seems curiously sympathetic to Chelmsford. If nothing else he repeated the mistake every arrogant officer fighting "natives" does - dividing his force before a superior enemy. Didn't work for Custer at Little Big Horn, didn't work for Baratieri at Adowa or Buller at Spion Kop. Certainly didn't work for Chelmsford, but that officer escaped destruction or censure.

"Do you know what lies at the bottom of the mainstream? Mediocrity!"

reply

Re Saul David's book on the Zulu War, whilst I haven't read it myself, it has attracted some criticism from recognised authorities on the subject, so it might be better to approach it with an open mind. Anyway, two books I have read, and which are very well written are 'How Can Man Die Better' on Isandhlwana, and 'Like Wolves on the Fold' on Rorkes Drift, both written by Lt Col Mike Snook. I can certainly recommend these, which are written from the viewpoint of a serving soldier rather than a historian. Gives something of a new angle on the subject, particularly the legend of the ammunition boxes which could not be opened and which does not appear to have any basis in fact.

reply

It is certainly well documented that both Chard and Bromhead were undistinguished in their careers until Rorke's Drift. They were both career officers but had been stuck on the lowest commissioned rank despite many years service (and this was 20 years after the Cardwell reforms that abolished the purchase system in favour of one based on merit). It is suggested in several histories that they were both at Rorke's Drift as it was a backwater posting. Apparently, their career advancement after the battle (Chard ended up a major) and their fame caused much resentment amongst their peers.

reply

Correct.
Little wonder there was resentment at the time as these two characters had not even planned the defence of the outpost! Showing both Officers as heroes in the film was a travesty.
As has also been documented, the Govt. needed a victory after the humiliation of Isandhlwana, and thus we have Rorke's Drift's place in the history annals.

reply

I wouldn't call it a travesty. They did actually command the defence even though they were initially reluctant (and who wouldn't be?) to remain at the post. Their behaviour in defending Rorke's Drift was exceptional compared to their usual conduct as officers but they were justifiably awarded the VC, within its criteria. The sheer number of VCs awarded was obviously politically motivated, to deflect the public's attention away from the disaster at Isandhlwana, but it was still appropriate that Chard and Bromhead were recipients (even though it was initially unfair on Dalton).

reply

As has also been documented, the Govt. needed a victory after the humiliation of Isandhlwana,


But it wasn't exactly made up though. 4,000 Zulus did indeed attack the hospital and supply depot at Rorke's Drift and if they had managed to succeed it would have doubly humiliated the British because this time it was in Natal. The battle of Rorke's Drift was a gallant stand and very well defended. It still goes down in the annuls of military history as one of the shining examples of a stand against far more massive odds.

reply

Regarding the Cardwell Reforms, these took place between 1868 and 1874, the purchase of commisions being abolished in, I believe, 1871. Regarding Chard and Bromhead's lack of promotion, this was not entirely unheard of in the army of that period. Rapid promotion was usually a result of casualties in action or death by disease. Wasn't there an officers toast to the effect of 'Here's to a bloody war or a sickly season!'?

I doubt whether Rorkes Drift was a 'backwater posting', it was a supply point for the invasion of Zululand and had to be commanded by someone, Major Spalding was the officer in command, and needed a garrison of infantry to guard it. Someone had to carry out this duty and I doubt if it was any reflection on the officers who were ordered to do it.

As for any resentment amongst their peers for their advancement, you will always get people who are jealous of others success!

reply

Re Saul David's book on the Zulu War, whilst I haven't read it myself, it has attracted some criticism from recognised authorities on the subject, so it might be better to approach it with an open mind. Anyway, two books I have read, and which are very well written are 'How Can Man Die Better' on Isandhlwana, and 'Like Wolves on the Fold' on Rorkes Drift, both written by Lt Col Mike Snook. I can certainly recommend these, which are written from the viewpoint of a serving soldier rather than a historian. Gives something of a new angle on the subject, particularly the legend of the ammunition boxes which could not be opened and which does not appear to have any basis in fact.


I have both those books too and they are the best works ever written on Isandlwana and Rorke's Drift and Colonel Mile Snook makes an excellent and very detailed case that Durnford was indeed majorly to blame for Isandlwana. It was his fall back which completely collapsed the right flank and the original accusations against Durnford have a lot of merit. Durnford was seeking his personal glory but tactically fouled up.

Ian Knight's book are also good.

reply

The importance of Rorke's Drift was highlighted for the benefit of the public at home who had been dumbstruck (quote) by the defeat earlier at Isandhlwana.


They both happened on the same day. There were no telegrams/cable services/wire services in 1879. The British public didn't hear about either event for a long time afterwards and they got the news of both battles on the same day.

Secondly it was Chard who gave the order to pull back from the hospital into a tighter perimeter etc. He did well. So did Bromhead. They weren't the useless lunk heads that they have been accused of.

reply

I agree that Chard and Bromhead weren't quite the useless officers later revisionists like to claim they were- read any of Ian Knight's works on the subject. Chard still rose to Colonel which is unlikely if he had little ability even given his fame. Plenty of VC winners didn't ever rise in the ranks much further, indeed Bromhead never advanced higher than Major.
In reality if they had all been wiped out then Rorke's Drift would have barely warranted a mention, it would just have been considered part of the same disaster as Isandhlwana.

"Oh dear. How sad. Never mind!"

reply

Yes, Ian Knight's books are very good, Hotrodder. I have three of them.

Good point about other VC winners not always rising high in the ranks either.

reply