The blame should certainly not be placed entirely on Lightoller's shoulders. There were a great number of mitigating circumstances that led to the events of that night.
Walter Lord, in his follow up, "The Night Lives On", says that during the lifeboat loading, some of the women in the boats were begging Lightoller to let their husbands in to row. Smith was around at that particular time, and when Lightoller said no, Smith backed him up 100%.
That novel was written in '85, close to 30 years after Lord originally wrote "A Night to Remember", so it's probably a pretty solid guess that the story is correct as he had a lot of time for further research. Based on that comment, and Smith's intervention, why would he change his stance on women and children first? He's under the assumption it's women and children only, and Smith has just backed him up. I would assume, in his shoes, that I was following Smith's orders.
The second thing to take under advisement is that Lightoller only oversaw the lowering of 5 lifeboats on his side of the ship. I must admit, until recently, I was always under the assumption that Murdoch had the starboard side and Lightoller the port side. Apparently, that wasn't the case.
And don't forget, while I'm not blaming him, it was Murdoch who oversaw the lowering of Boat #1, which had 12 people out of a capacity of 40, and of the 12, had 7 crewmen. If we're going to try to accuse Lightoller for additional loss of life for not letting men go, we have to afford the same to Murdoch.
The third factor was a lack of preparation. There were no lifeboat drills during the actual voyage. The one lifeboat drill consisted of a handful of crewmen lowering two lifeboats into the water, and paddling around while the ship was docked. With a full drill, things may have been different. Also, the officers were never informed of A. The actual capacity of each of the boats, or B. The fact that they could even be lowered somewhat overloaded and still have stayed afloat. It's been reported repeatedly that the officers lowering the boats were afraid of overcrowding and fears the davits would cave. Thus they feared to fill them.
And a fourth factor involves speed. I think part of the reason boats were sometimes going down half empty was because of a lack of communication and a fear the ship was going to sink before they could get all the boats lowered. Technically, it did. They had to try and float off the last two collapsibles because they couldn't transport them to the davits soon enough.
And as has been brought up before, The fifth problem involves lack of communication from the bridge. Smith ordered the boats lowered Lightoller started, then Chief Officer Wilde told him not to. He went back to the bridge, again got confirmation to lower from Smith, and started lowering. It's also painfully obvious the officers were under-informed. 4th Officer Boxhall wasn't informed the ship was sinking until 1:15, one hour and 35 minutes after striking the iceberg.
And there's the dreaded 6th factor. Captain Smith didn't issue a general call for evacuation. Partly because, I'm sure, he didn't want a panic, but again, another reason lifeboats weren't going down filled, at the beginning, most definitely, was that no one knew the ship was going to sink, and when faced with the opportunity of a warm ship or a boat in the cold in the middle of the dark ocean, they chose the ship. John Jacob Astor is famously quoted as saying, "We are safer here than in that little boat."
Did Lightoller make some mistakes? Sure. Anyone in his position would have. Captain Smith was a 42-year veteran of the sea, and he made a great many more mistakes than Lightoller. A lot of things that could go wrong did on that particular night. Lightoller certainly shouldn't be blamed more than anyone else, and frankly, I think he did pretty damn well under the circumstances.
I love to love my Lisa.
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